A Critique of Nelson Goodman’s Concept of the New Riddle

The development of the method of creation has been privy to the foundation and solution of dawns. At the initial level of its development, it has been privy to the centenarian bottom of instauration discovered by Hume. After the solution of the former broadcast, however, a impertinent riddle of induction was discovered by Nelson Goodman. In stead of this, this paper opts to consider the development of the method of induction as a methodology defined by Hume and Goodmans conception of the Inductive method.Induction refers to a method of reasoning by which a general law or principle is inferred from observed particular instances (Flew 171). The method of inducive inference may be considered as the primary means through which vindications ar guessinge to show the relationship of evidence towards particular givens (Norton 2). The process of induction, in this sense, may be seen to arise whenever we seam that evidence lends support to a hypothesis while in the process failing to establish its deductive certainty. It was such a readiness of the method of induction that enabled the conception of the first riddle. What follows is a presentation of the main arguments of the aforementioned riddle as formulated by David Hume.Hume argued that since no necessary connections exists between empirical phenomena, it is always possible that a future observation will prove our inferences wrongfulness no event how good-hearted it may have been or how richly supported by past observations. This problem, in the more recent formulations of the problem has been referred to as the conformity principle in this sense the lack of such uniformity.According to the argument, nature has no uniformity. If such is the case it in that locationby follows that there is no voucher that which ensure the amity of mans most refined predictions. It might be argued that such an assumption has never been denied in the formulation of predictions however there has been orga nisation regarding the results of such an agreement or lack thereof within the province of induction. To some, it means that induction is never logical or justified, while to others, it means that induction simply calls for different standards of well-groundedity (Landesman 164). The latter view strips the aforementioned riddle Humean riddle of its knobbed context.This is limpid if one considers that since the forms of deductive legitimateity are inapplicable to induction, it cannot be a problem that inducive inference is unavoidably attended by the possibility that a future observation may prove it wrong (Goodman 4). The old riddle is then dismissed because it cannot possibly be the authentic problem of induction.Fact, Fiction, and Forecast present Goodmans construal of what he refers to as the natural riddle of induction. After refuting the old riddle of induction the refutation of which is lucid in the former paragraph, Goodman proceeds to outline what he takes to be th e accredited problem of induction and its tentative solution. The problem of induction, he writes, is a problem of demonstrating the difference between valid and invalid predictions (Goodman 4).According to Goodman, a prediction is valid if it conforms to a valid sway of induction, and a rule is valid if it yields valid predictions. He acknowledges that such an assumption is characterized by circularity however he notes that it is authorized to perceive such a conception of the problem in terms of the conceptions of justifications for arguments. Goodman notes that inducive predictions based on past regularities work crack than those based on any other alternative. If such is the case, the rules for formulating predictions must be constructed in such a way that they will coincide with public practices of inductive reasoning.This, on the other passel, is further developed by the reference of predictions, which it produces. This is clearly explicated by Rubenstein as he notes, t he centerpiece of a valid inductive logic according to Goodman is its reliance on past regularities, and the prescriptive law of inductive validity is inseparable from a descriptive account of how inductive judgments are comm moreover made (39). This has been the result of Goodmans dissolution of the old riddle of induction. What follows this is Goodmans explication that the most promising solution of the aforementioned riddle is untenable. It is through the introduction of such untenability that Goodman presents what he perceives to be the new riddle of induction.Goodman presents two hypotheses that are to be addressed through the use of the inductive method. One says that all emeralds are green and the other says that all emeralds are grue, where grue is said to apply to all things examined before t just in case they are green however to other things just in case they are blue (Goodman 10). Both hypotheses seem to be evenly well supported by the evidence all emeralds examined p rior to t have been found to be green and grue. However, the two hypotheses are in return exclusive. If emeralds are grue, they will be blue at t and thereafter, except if the alternative hypothesis is correct, they will be green. Thus, we are left with the enigma that Goodman christened the new riddle of induction.We cannot, after all, justify induction by appealing to past regularities. However, the reason, according to Goodman, is not the lack of the elusive uniformity principle, but the previously unrecognized ubiquity of regularities. According to Goodman, regularities exist where one finds them. In relation to this Goodman states that one, however, finds them everywhere (12). If such is the case, it therefore follows that it is useless to base inductive validity on past regularities since it is not possible to predict and thence distinguish which regularities are valid and invalid.At this point, I would like to present a summary of the aforementioned discussion. In the afo rementioned discussion, Goodman believes that the old riddle the Humean riddle/the uniformity principle has been dissolved and that induction is justified by past regularities. The only remaining difficulty he sees, however, lies in finding a rule for distinguishing between regularities that do and do not yield valid inductive predictions.As was noted in the above discussion, the possibility of such is not possible. This is evident if one considers that regularity necessitates the occurrence of acts of inductive inference. Therefore, the genuine problem of induction cannot be the distinction between the distinction of regularities that do or do not yield valid inductive predictions since the specification of such necessitates the formulation of inductive inferences.As I reckon, Goodman aforementioned conception fails to account for the process of induction. It is important to note that Goodman contends that induction begins with regularity. Rubenstein notes, induction does not begin with regularity it ends with it (44). The unsuccessful person to consider this leads Goodman to misconstrue the problem of induction.It is important to note that experience of veracity does not necessarily start with regularities but rather with individual observations. The share of induction, in this sense lies in providing us with justified methods that allows us to put the observations that we will account for as regularities. Goodman, however, failed to account for this.In addition to this, it is important to note that such a failure can also be traced to Goodmans assumptions regarding the process in which individuals formulate inferences. Goodmans error is compounded when he makes a distinction between identifying regularity and projecting it. Once we have obdurate that our observations represent regularity, it is automatically projected in both temporal directions. This is, in fact, what we mean by applying the term regularity to our data.Furthermore, Stich and Nisbett contend that the equilibrium with inductive practices that Goodman posited as a necessary aspect in formulating a valid inductive methodology is neither necessary nor sufficient for a rule of inductive inference to be justified (194). They argue that such an assumption fails to consider that human subjects regularly and systematically make invalid inferences and that there an instance wherein human reasoning enables an individual to accept invalid rules and protest valid ones that ought to govern the inference at hand (Stitch and Nisbett 194).In summary, the aforementioned paper presented Goodmans arguments in relation to his conception of the new riddle in induction. Such a riddle, however, under scrutiny may be seen as based upon a mistaken assumption of the justification process of beliefs that necessitates the introduction of information garnered through the method of induction. This is evident, for example, if one considers the vogue in which observations enable the formulati on of regularities and not the other way around. An synopsis of Goodmans supposed riddle of induction thereby leaves the reader question if such a riddle may be considered as a valid concern for the adherents of the inductive methodology.Works CitedFlew, Anthony. A Dictionary of Philosophy. London goat god Books, 1983.Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Massachussets Harvard University Press, 1983.Landesman, Charles. Skepticism The Central Issues. London Blackwell Publishing, 2002.Rubenstein, Arthur. Induction, Grue Emeralds and Lady Macbeths Fallacy. The Philosophical every quarter 48.190 (Jan. 1998) 37-49.Stitch, Stephen and Richard Nisbett. Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning. Philosophy of Science 47.2 (Jun. 1980) 188-202.